## THE WAR IN THE SOUTH-WEST.

The End of Major-Gen. Den Carles

THE LAST OF HIS MAGNIFICENT FAILURES.

Authentic History of his Second Unsuccoseful Campaign Against Bragg.

His Removal a Long-Existing Military Necessity.

What the Official Investigation of his Conduct will Mstablish.

the Judgment of the Army of the Chie Upon Its Late Commander-in-Chief.

The Case of Gen. Gilbert, and Other Interesting Unwritten Incidents of the Last Campaign in Kentucky.

From Our Special Correspondent. Washington, Nov. 2, 1882. Administrative neglect has been a standing comphiat with the loyal North-West ever since the outbrank of the war. A long record of tardily-rebuked or entirely unpunished military sins of omission and commission furnishes convincing evidence of at times fatal delay in Executive correction of men and measures. No more striking instance of this exists than the long tolerance of the mismanagement of affairs in the most important department of the West, by Major-Gen. Buell-who has verily proved an evil genius to the loyal cause, and is alone responsible for the protraction of the war in the Mississippi Valley up to the present time, and an undefinable period hereafter, by repeatedly missing unequaled epportunities of striking crushing blows at the rebellion. Yet no sconer was the long-deserved judgment at last irrevocably pronounced, no sooner was he stamped with official disgrace, than efforts were made by that portion of the Northern press that always delights in honoring the failures of Democratic Generale, to represent him a martyr to political proscription—a victim to "Abolitionism." To stop this false, malicious cry—to show that this "martyr and victim" is really the lamentable sham of a General the intelligent loyal public has believed him to be these months, and that his removal was a long-existing absolute necessity, and made on purely military grounds, I have prepared the following review of the last phases of his disastrous career, viz: his second unsuccessful campaign against Bragg in Kentucky. From almost every page of his record during the last few months ample proof of incompetency could be extracted. But the closing one fully answers my purpose, and hence I shall confine myself to it. Most of the movements and performances of the Army of the Ohio below detailed I witnessed with my own eyes. For what I am not cognizant of from personal observation, I furnish the names of officers that will corroborate my statements, if called upon, before Count of Inquiry. The accompanying map will enable the reader to appreciate the grievous derelictions of duty to be related in their full extent. There is just ground for appreheusion that the fearful, fruitless loss of his, property, time and opportunity during the mal-administration of Gen. Badl, has worked irreparable injury to the loval interess in the West. May the chief arbiter of military fortunes at the White-House never have cause to ray to himself that the deposal of the unworthy Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Ohio was made too lote. military grounds, I have prepared

At the opening of the campaign, by the march of At the opening of the campaign, by the march of the Army of the Ohio from Louisville on the morning of the lat ult., the main body of the Rebel army, which Bragg had led into Kentucky, and which was positively known to consist of four divisions, not exceeding, in strength, from thirty to forty-five thousand infantry, with between sixty and severity paces of artillery, was encamped in the vicinity of Bardstown, forty miles a little cast of south of Louisville. The force of Kirby Smith, consisting of two divisions of not over litteen housand men, with Section 1997 and 1997


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## KENTUCKY. CAMPAIGN THE



exception of some cavalry on his left, which a fartillery shots soon sent out of sight.

This was about 2 p. m. Gon. McCook had no prehensions of an attack. Nor had be received. expected, any orders to make one upon the en Gen. Buell had evidently abandoned the idea of gaging the Rebels in a general action that day, intention to do so, officially announced the pre-evening, was probably given up in consequen which did not appear on Gilbert's right until late in the delay in the movements of Crittenden's corps, which did not appear on Gilbert's right until late in the afternoon. But, in postponing his "general attack upon the enemy," Gen. Buell did not dream that his adversary was about venturing an attack upon him; had issued no orders, as he was in duty bound to do, providing for the possibility of such a contingency.

bound to do, providing for the possibility of such a contingency.

The enemy, after forming in line well concealed from our generals, in the early part of the forenoon, spent some hours in feeling the position of Gilbert's troops, as evidenced by the repeated advances already referred to, more or less strong, upon Sheridan's lines. Bragg says in his report of the opening of the battle: "Finding the enemy indisposed to advance upon us and knowing that he was receiving heavy re-enforcements, I deemed it best to assail him vigorously and so directed."

The "heavy re-enforcements" were unquestionable.

The "heavy re-enforcements" were unquestionably the divisions of Gen. McCook, whose appearance and formation in line directly in front of Polk's right could not have escaped his notice. It is not probable that the Rebel generals had knowledge of the could not have escaped by the could not have escaped his notice. probable that the Rebel generals had knowledge the fact that the greater portion of McCook's or mand consisted of new levies. It seems more plan ble to assume that they acted simply upon strategic axiom to bring one's own whole stread to bear upon part of the enemy, but hit upon numerically as well as intrinsically weakest port of our line from its accidental position nearest

numerically as well as intrinsically weakest portion of our line from its accidental position nearest to them.

The attacking column came up with the skirmishers of Gen. McCook at about 2 p. m., and in a few minutes his whole line sustained a flerce onset. I will not attempt to, give a fail narrative of the terrible struggle that then ensued and continued until nightfall. The publication of the full and graphis reports of Gens. McCook and Rousseau, in The Trinuve, some days since, renders this unnecessary. I will only mark out such salient published and unpublished points as will insure a true understanding of the merits of the management of Gen. Buell's army in that sanguinary conflict.

The formation of McCook's two divisions of five brigades at the time of the first attack was this Starkweather s brigade, on the extreme left; Terrell's, in front and to the right of it, in the left center; Harris's, in the right center; Wetster's, in the rear of Harris's, in the position of a recerve; Lytle's, on the right of Harris, as the extreme right of the line. Six batteries were distributed at suitable points along the line. The fighting strength of McCook's command was about 11,500, of which Rousseau had seven and Jacksou the remainder.

The left and left center, under Starkweather and Terrell, first experienced a most desperate sasault by a largely superior force of the enemy, manifestly bent upon carrying this all-important position, and turning our line. Gen. Jackson was with Terrell's beingade. He fell at the first fire of the Rebels, and, under the tremendous volleys now poured upon Terrell's new regiments, they gave way in a few moments in the utmost confusion, and were driven pell mell from the field, leaving seven gans of a battery of eight in the hands of the enemy. Thus, in the first half-bour of the battle, one fifth of the Union force engaged was virtually placed hors decombat, and a portion of its line broken.

This midoritune, together with the vigor of the attuck and great numerical superiority of the e

dark.

Harris's Brigade, on the right center, fought with equal bravery and stoodfastness. It likewise stemmed the onsets of an outnumbering enemy for several hours. After exhausting their supplies of cartridges, the men secured and fired with those of their dead and wounded comrades, and even after their ground for some time under a heavy fire, to which also three divisions each, one of which he proposed to three divisions each, one of which he proposed to three divisions each, one of which he proposed to three divisions each, one of which he proposed to three divisions each, one of which he proposed to three divisions each, one of which he proposed to three divisions each, one of which he proposed to three divisions each, one of which he proposed to the could not return a single shot, until order reached them to return a single shot, until order reached them to return a single shot, until order reached them to return a single shot that the could not return a single shot the could not return a single shot the could not return a single shot that the could not return a single shot that the could not return a single shot the could not